

Concrete Steps to Create a Culture of Security

Arkadiy Tetelman / BSidesSF 2019

AGENDA

- **Why does it matter**
- **Concrete examples**
- **Guiding principles**
- **Measuring success**
- **Questions**

WHO AM I



- **Arkadiy Tetelman (@arkadiyt)**
- **Staff Application Security at Lob**
- **Previously appsec at Airbnb, Twitter**
- **Fun fact: I don't know how to ride a bike**

Why does security culture matter

WHY DOES SECURITY CULTURE MATTER

- Most security work is not done by the security team
- The security team must work through influence
- Employees are your eyes and ears on the ground
- Build social capital

Concrete Examples

1) SECURITY CHAMPIONS

- many different versions of this; depends on the organization
- at Lob, this is a “security enthusiast” interest group

2) FIRESIDE BUG BOUNTY

Hi lobsters,

Yes it's that time again, time for another Fireside Bug Bounty! This time we're going to learn about a cross-site scripting bug on [lob.com](#) (ENG-7633). Thanks Jerome for volunteering to take this bug and getting a fix out today.

XSS in [lob.com](#)

Cross site scripting (XSS) is a vulnerability that occurs when user input is injected into the HTML DOM somewhere, allowing for execution of arbitrary javascript in a victim's browser.

We had an XSS in our address verification demo - here's a link you can view to see what it looks like (until the deploy goes out and then this proof of concept will no longer work):

[Proof of Concept link](#)

You'll notice that the address verification recipient is set to

```
<span style="color:red; font-size: 10em">Hello</span>
```

which is then injected directly into the page html:

The address is deliverable.

OVERVIEW

[What do these results mean?](#)

Recipient:

HELLO

Primary Line: 185 BERRY ST STE 6100

Secondary
Line:

2) FIRESIDE BUG BOUNTY

- description of what the bug is
- how to exploit it
- impact
- fixing this particular instance
- solving this entire class of vulnerability

3) SEND OUT CURRENT HAPPENINGS


- when browsers started enforcing certificate transparency

When your browser tries to connect to lob.com, it first performs various checks against the certificate it received before deciding to proceed:

- do the certificate hostname(s) match the website hostname?
- is the certificate expired?
- is the certificate revoked?
- (many other checks)
- *is the certificate trusted?*

That last part is the most relevant for this email - a browser will consider a certificate trusted if it is cryptographically signed by another trusted certificate. Well, why is that parent certificate signed by another trusted certificate. So why is *that* parent then trusted?

There's a chicken and egg problem of figuring out how to bootstrap trust. This is solved by your browser (or your OS, or your Java runtime, or whatever client is connecting) shipping with considers trusted. For instance you can view all the roots trusted by MacOS in the keychain app - I've got 170 (!) trusted roots:




(as an aside: a "root" certificate just means the certificate is self-signed. Anyone including you and I can make a root (= self-signed) certificate. All trusted certificates shipped with your O. certificates are trusted)

Problems with Certificate Authorities

3) SEND OUT CURRENT HAPPENINGS

- when we deployed preloaded strict-transport-security on our website



Chrome, before HSTS

Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **lob.com** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). [Learn more](#)

NET::ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID


☐ Automatically send some [system information and page content](#) to Google to help detect dangerous apps and sites. [Privacy policy](#)

HIDE ADVANCED

[Back to safety](#)

This server could not prove that it is **lob.com**; its security certificate is not trusted by your computer's operating system. This may be caused by a misconfiguration or an attacker intercepting your connection.

[Proceed to lob.com \(unsafe\)](#)



Chrome, after HSTS

Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from **lob.com** (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). [Learn more](#)

NET::ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID

☐ Automatically send some [system information and page content](#) to Google to help detect dangerous apps and sites. [Privacy policy](#)

HIDE ADVANCED [Reload](#)

lob.com normally uses encryption to protect your information. When Google Chrome tried to connect to lob.com this time, the website sent back unusual and incorrect credentials. This may happen when an attacker is trying to pretend to be lob.com, or a Wi-Fi sign-in screen has interrupted the connection. Your information is still secure because Google Chrome stopped the connection before any data was exchanged.

You cannot visit lob.com right now because the website uses HSTS. Network errors and attacks are usually temporary, so this page will probably work later.

3) SEND OUT CURRENT HAPPENINGS


- when we had a quarter's worth of bug bounty data

They've submitted 210 issues to us. Of those, we took no action on 184 of them (either the issue was a duplicate or the reporter was not a member of our program).

Of the remaining 26 reports, some are currently in the triage queue and 14 were valid, triaged issues. We've been experimenting with some ways to reduce it, but it's always going to be hard to eliminate it completely.

For those valid 14 issues, we've paid out a total of \$12,100 (our budget for the year was around \$10,000). Our median payout is \$500 and our average payout is \$864.29. You can see our public dashboard at <https://lobsters.atlassian.net/secure/Dashboard.jspa?selectPageId=10203>









Hackerone also keeps track of our response efficiency statistics:




3) SEND OUT CURRENT HAPPENINGS

- writeup current security events & explain their significance
- know your audience

4) HACKING 101

OWASP Juice Shop				
<div>→ Login ↻ Contact Us   English Search... 🔍 🏆 Score Board ⓘ About Us</div>				
All Products				
Image	Product	Description	Price	
	Apple Juice (1000ml)	The all-time classic.	1.99	
	Apple Pomace	Finest pressings of apples. Allergy disclaimer: Might contain traces of worms. Can be sent back to us for recycling.	0.89	
	Banana Juice (1000ml)	Monkeys love it the most.	1.99	


4) HACKING 101




5) NSA POSTCARDS

- **2016:** A government watchdog group FOIA-ed the NSA for security propaganda posters from the 1950s and 1960s
- **2018:** NSA responded with 136 posters

5) NSA POSTCARDS



5) NSA POSTCARDS



5) NSA POSTCARDS



6) SECURITY CONFERENCE WATCH PARTY

- meet at lunch once every 2 weeks to watch a security talk
- send out a reminder the day before with a summary of the talk

6) SECURITY CONFERENCE WATCH PARTY

3	Title	Length	Link	Date Watched
4	Blue Team Fundamentals	27m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Di34iv388A	5/17/2018
5	A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parsers	50m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D1S-G8rJrEk	5/31/2018
6	The Security of Class Game Consoles	35m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0XmiXs8iRw	6/14/2018
7	Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle	46n	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OobLb1McnxI	6/28/2018
8	NSA TAO Chief on Disrupting Nation State Hackers	34m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDJb8WOJYdA	7/11/2018
9	The Web Tracking Arms Race: Past, Present, and Future	21m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UhSya5J_cxw	7/26/2018
10	Twenty Years of MMORPG Hacking: Better Graphics, Same Exploits	45m	https://www60.zippyshare.com/d/DkUIT5Bw/30891	8/22/2018
11	Gig Work and the Digital Security Divide	19m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RMDT69ZdEfQ	9/5/2018
12	An Open Letter The White Hat's Dilemma	49m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eEeHTQHTSgE	9/19/2018
13	How WhatsApp Reduced Spam while Launching End-to-End Encryption	18m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LBTOkIrhKXk	10/3/2018
14	American Spies	15m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nbJy210s8II	10/17/2018
15	The Price of Cyber-Warfare	4m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XGutGYNfEw0	11/1/2018
16	Running With Scissors	18m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ltrV-Qmh3oY	11/14/18
17	Become an IAM Policy Master in 60 Minutes or Less	55m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQsK4MtsELU	11/29/18
18	From Bounties to Bureaucracy	36m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6KZGmPpUvLI	12/14/2018
19	This Was Not an Intended Use of the Internet	24m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=laO-QL6pCSE	1/10/19
20	Inside Cloudbleed	39m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hojAgTsTeCA	2/7/2019
21	Don't Talk To the Police	46m	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-7o9xYp7eE	2/21/2019

7) SHOW-AND-TELL

- every other week on Friday
- 5m presentations by any employee on any topic

8) SECURITY LITTLE WINS

- monthly email calling out all the small security wins

8) SECURITY LITTLE WINS



me (Arkadiy Tetelman [change](#))



Other recipients: security@lob.com

Hey all,

Here are some little security wins we had in January:

██████████: successfully upgraded lob-api to node ██████████ to fix a known vulnerability. Previous attempts failed due to a memory leak - kudos to ██████████ for figuring out the root cause ([ENG-9456](#))

██████████ removed lob api keys from ██████████ (ENG-9580, [ENG-9577](#), [ENG-9579](#))

██████████ removed lob api keys from ██████████ (ENG-9581)

██████████ removed lob api keys from ██████████ (ENG-9578)

██████████ made script to codify the blacklisted database columns that ██████████ should not get access to ([ENG-9569](#))

██████████ upgraded a known vulnerable dependency in the lob-java client ([ENG-9635](#))

██████████ rotated our team account api key ██████████ (email)

██████████ limited lob-api asset downloads to 256MB ██████████ (lob-api)

██████████ deleted unused ██████████ s3 bucket ([ENG-9540](#))

██████████ removed unused github credentials from CircleCI for several repos ([metrics-go](#), [mock](#), [assets-proxy](#), [sentry-echo](#))

██████████ updated our versions of golang to ██████████ in several repos to resolve a known vulnerability ([mock](#), [flashpaper](#), [assets-proxy](#))

██████████ dropped unused ██████████ column from the verifications table, ensuring no one writes to it by accident (lob-api). If anyone is looking for a fun easy win there are a few more tables to

██████████ added a regression test for ██████████ (ENG-9380)

██████████ removed an unused SPF DNS record, which previously allowed the company ██████████ to send email as if it were from [lob.com](#) (ENG-9814)

██████████ added webhook logging for the target webhook hostname, path, and resolved ip addresses ([ENG-8820](#)). This addresses a visibility pain-point we had when ██████████ alerted us that we v suspicious outbound network connections.

██████████ added/adding webhook signatures ([ENG-1273](#)). This is something we've wanted to do since ██████████

Also despite the subject of this email, we had 3 big security wins:

██████████ built and deployed a new version of ██████████ to resolve our ██████████

THINGS THAT DIDN'T WORK

- Security 20% time
- Didn't focus enough on non-engineering functions

Guiding Principles

GUIDING PRINCIPLES


- **Add value**
- **Be visible**
- **Be available**

Why does security culture matter

**How much should I prioritize
security culture over my
other work**

HOW MUCH SHOULD I INVEST

- Measuring culture is hard & subjective
- Anecdotally seeing improvements
- Invest more in the beginning: culture has momentum



Infosec: Nobody listens to security people! 😡

Also infosec: Your password needs to be at least 15 characters long, contain numbers, upper and lowercase letters, and at least 4 special symbols.

Oh, and you can't write it down.

And you have to change it every 90 days.

11:55 AM · Mar 1, 2019 · Twitter for iPhone

279 Retweets

896 Likes



Questions

Twitter: @arkadiyt

I'm hiring: bit.ly/lobsecurity